Surgical technique and the control of infections that can follow surgical procedures are part of the grim facts of war. It is a terrifying irony that while men strive on the battlefield to find more efficient and faster ways of killing other men, forms dehumanized as the "enemy," human beings behind the lines of "glorious" battle strive with equal vigor to find more efficient and faster ways of saving the precious lives of those whom they see as neither allies nor enemies, but as fellow humans. For the surgeon, war is never the glory of battle or the quest for victory. It is never hard and constructed of metal. Its focus is never the distant entity at which he aims. For the surgeon, war is between his hands. It is so hard for the soldier on the field to associate the trigger he pulls and the hard projectile he fires with the gruesome damage inflicted upon the delicate human flesh and bone with which that small projectile collides. This is the association that the war surgeon is forced to make with every soldier thrown onto his operating table. War surgery has its own horror because it is never elective. The enemy's weapons of pain have made the first incision into the body and the surgeon is compelled to remedy the dangerous incursion of an evil operation.
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Naturally, the scores of wounded simultaneously become an extensive, albeit dreadful, schoolroom for the surgeon. During the course of the American Civil War, savage fighting threw American surgeons into the most terrifying schoolroom they would ever be cursed to see. It is a sad fact of history that while weaponry in warfare was advancing, the simultaneously advancing tools and techniques of medicine and surgery were still behind the weapons. The surgical advances stimulated by the human damage inflicted during this war were not isolated discoveries, but rather a substantial part of the continuum of scientific and medical progress made during the nineteenth century. Earlier advances in the use of anesthesia made most of Civil War surgery possible. But much of medical and surgical practice was still open for debate, and the war of 1861-1865 became, in effect, a testing ground for conflicting theories -a testing ground made possible by the forced sacrifice of thousands of wounded soldiers. While Civil War surgeons and surgical theorists made significant contributions to anesthesia, the management of hemorrhage, and amputation procedure, realized the danger and learned to understand the spread of infection, developed antiseptic method, recorded their findings and data, and provided the post-war nation with a core of experienced surgeons, the facts that scientific advancement by experimentation is a slow and costly process and that the medical corps was hampered by ineffective administration in a wartime govemment sadly prevented these advances from providing substantial new aid to wounded soldiers during the war.
During the American Civil War approximately 620,000 men lost their lives. Almost every family or group of people in the country directly felt the sacrifices of this clash between the United States Government and the seceding Confederation of southern states.
While the weapons of modern warfare made it possible to kill many soldiers instantly, the number who were wounded and later died of their wounds is staggering -110,000 recorded in the Union army alone [1] [2] [3] . Treatment of wounds in war is largely dependent on the weapons and tactics used in the fighting. Most injuries during the Civil War were inflicted by a soft, lead, conoidal bullet fired from a musket [4] . Since the area of tissue and bone affected by a bullet's collision is inversely proportional to its velocity and directly proportional to its cross-sectional area, the damage done by these round, slow-moving projectiles was devastating to both flesh and bone, opening large wounds that were directly susceptible to infection, especially in bone joints. The softness of lead made it malleable upon impact, so that the deformed bullet, while not being sanitized by speed, pulled pieces of clothing through torn skin and could lodge itself in tissue and alongside bones, badly lacerating the surrounding soft parts of limbs and spreading numerous bone fragments [5] .
While soft lead wrecks havoc when it collides with bone, most Civil War soldiers were lucky that more hits were sustained in the arms and legs than in the abdomen, thorax, neck, or head. Gunshot wounds to the limbs comprised 71 percent of all wounds. Eighteen percent were in the torso, and 11 percent were in the neck, face, or head. Of torso wounds, there were three times more in the thorax than the abdomen. These statistics for wounds incurred from any weapon lowered the mortality rate substantially. This was a result of tactics, for in the face of rapid-fire weaponry soldiers most often hid behind some sort of cover, such as trees, rocks, or earthworks, thus protecting the large part of their bodies [4] .
Contrary to what contemporary films on the Civil War would indicate in terms of lines of soldiers walking directly into cannon fire or engaging the enemy at full speed with the bayonet, few injuries were incurred as a result of cannonball or cutting weapon. Of 144,000 recorded wound cases by fire, 108,000 were hit by Minie Ball, 16,000 by round ball, 12,500 by shell fragments, 359 by cannonball, and 130 by explosive bullet. For instance, during the Battle of the Wilderness 500 cannons were used, but only 12 soldiers were hit by cannonball [4] .
These wound results were the product of the tactics of a new, mechanized form of warfare. The development of rifled muskets and conoidal bullets, which increased the effective range of fire from about 100 yards to 300 to 500 yards, forced the fighting to take place at long range and practically prohibited mass charges. Artillery was still only effective at 200 to 300 yards, making artillerymen targets for enemy musket fire, which forced cannons to take on a defensive role behind the infantry lines. This increased range and the fear that new recruits have of bare steel made bayonets largely unused by infantry and sabers shunned by the cavalry in favor of pistols or revolvers [1] . Thus the wounds that arrived on the operative table reflected the course of the fighting.
Despite the fact that blades were hardly ever used, the pain inflicted by firearms was an excruciating torture to soldiers. Pain was a constant factor in the management of patients, both [7, 8] .
It often seemed that surgeons were mere monsters, inflicting pain upon the helpless casualties of battle, but the record of use of anesthetics indicates that surgeons were indeed trying to reduce pain as much as possible [4] . Hannah Ropes wrote of many a disagreement with physicians over patient care, but she was also eager to praise those she saw as true and benevolent healers:
Over the bed of a man with a bullet in his thigh I shook hands with Dr. Hinkle. How gentle he was to the suffering soldier; and how vigorously he worked to relieve him! Looking up full in his face at the first breathing spell, I was struck with his paleness, as well as the beauty of his manner ... [6] .
Anesthetics were often used even to change dressings and while opium pills were most commonly used to alleviate pain, doctors began experimenting with morphine applied directly to the wound or injected with syringe [4] .
When it came to general anesthetics, which undoubtedly made most surgical procedures even fathomable, there were still extensive debates. There had been numerous mishaps with chloroform and ether during the Crimean (1854-1856) and Mexican (1846-1848) Wars and many conservative doctors fought against their use in 1861. Arguments were put forth by the nineteenth century's leading physicians. British Surgeon General George James Guthrie felt that the excitement of the injury was a sufficient stimulant to carry a patient through a rough procedure. Dr. Alfred-Armand-Louis-Marie Velpeau was convinced that the shock that immediately followed injury would decay into depression, a danger potentially exacerbated by anesthesia. Dr. Thomas Cole thought that pain was a necessary stimulant to bring a patient out of shock. Despite these concerns, however, anesthesia was used extensively during the war, probably as a result of the invasive operations which surgeons wanted to perform. The chemical used most commonly was chloroform, favored for its small size, faster action, and noninflammability. Ether was hardly ever used in the field, but doctors were still unaware that ether was dangerous in cases of shock because it exacerbated hypotension through its vasodilatory action, often bringing about hemorrhaging. Chloroform, however, had its dangers as well, which had been observed in civil practice in the years preceding the war. An overdose was easy to administer and would instigate cardiac paralysis. In addition, doctors interested in experimentation also tried a mixture of ether with chloroform, which we now know to be extremely hazardous [4, 9, 10] .
War records indicate that general anesthesia was administered approximately 80,000 times, 76 percent with chloroform, 14 percent with ether, and nine percent with the mixture. Of these, there were 37 deaths due to chloroform, four due to ether, and two due to the mixture. Considering the fact that chloroform, easily misused, was the drug always administered in the field, and that war anesthetists were naturally under a great deal of pressure and suffering from fatigue, this mortality rate is staggeringly low. They were undoubtedly aided by the fact that operations were performed in open air, which diluted the drug before inhalation. The complete reason for such success is still uncertain, and contemporary surgeons were surprised but at the same time confident in the new practice. It is apparent that the procedure of administering anesthesia was greatly improved during the war, and post-war civil medicine gained a great deal from this "practice." Civil War anesthetists perfected the method of dropping the chloroform on a towel that would be placed over the face until a full dose was given [4] .
While pain was indeed a constant cause of suffering for the wounded man, the sight of blood was often even more psychologically debilitating. While anesthesia, an effect of human intervention, had an extremely low mortality rate, deaths due to bleeding were, despite the minimal hemorrhaging involved in gunshot wounds to the extremities, a persistent and very real danger [11] . While the wounds inflicted by cutting weapons were few, when hemorrhaging did occur, especially in the thoracic or abdominal cavities, blood loss increased fatigue and worsened the state of shock, extremely worrisome factors as far as the surgeon was concerned. Tourniquets had so often been used improperly by stretcher-men that most surgeons prohibited their use on the front lines, but the fact remained that blood loss was a problem that had to be dealt with quickly, lest a soldier be allowed to bleed to death. This fear of bleeding resulted in the cessation of the use of lancets and leeches to bleed out disease and the prohibition of both by the medical departments on both sides [4] . Many It was such eagerness that gave amputation surgery such a bad name during the war [12] .
Despite cries against excessive amputation, especially after the bloody battle of Antietam, it was largely accepted, except by the die-hard conservatives, that amputation was often the only option. In response to public outcry after Antietam, Union Medical Director Jonathan Letterman replied that he thought there had actually been too few amputations. Modem physicians agree with him, many medical historians now assessing the number of amputations as almost inadequate. Meanwhile, the problems inherent in not amputating were made much worse by the actions of the conservatives. In many instances, lives could have been saved if the wound had been left alone, but most surgeons attempted, using septic probes, most often bare fingers, to get at the bullet, find bone fragments, and resect portions of bone. The problems arising from this dirty exploratory surgery, in which the wound was generally ripped even further open by an aggressive surgeon, were generally pyemia at worst and osteomyelitis at best. The troubles caused by this meddling eventually led the Sanitary Commission to urge surgeons to avoid such exploratory procedures, except when vital. If amputation was to be avoided, it was best to step back from the wound [4, 13] .
The circumstances of orthopaedic surgery would have been better if there had been a more developed use of splints to stabilize limbs. The army developed "Smith's Anterior," a device which suspended a soldier's leg from the ceiling of an ambulance carriage, but this tool was widely misunderstood and seldom used. The greatest contribution of the Civil War to orthopaedics, however, was the Hodgen splint, developed in 1863 by American John T. Hodgen. This device, still used today in a similar form, provided a better extension of the limb, did not allow contraction, put no additional pressure on the bone, was relatively comfortable for the patient, and left the wound exposed for dressing and drainage while still held in the splint [4] .
If a bone was not thoroughly damaged by the rough ride to the field station behind the lines and it was determined that amputation was the best option, as it most often was, there was still debate as to which procedure would be implemented. This again was a debate among surgical theorists of the nineteenth century, which was played out upon the wounded during the Civil War. The flap operation, developed by William Cheselden in the eighteenth century, was the old, favored approach. It had the advantages of speed and the production of a better stump over the newer, circular operation. The flap operation did, however, remove a larger portion of the limb and left a wider wound. The exposure these two operations left to possible infection, the sloughing of the flesh they inflicted, the hemorrhaging they risked, and their post-operative resistance to transportation were debated well into the twentieth century. Each surgeon had his opinion and followed the doctrine of his choice while the debate raged back and forth between the theorists. This debate, it turns out, was a moot point. Today, surgeons use both methods, depending on the circumstances of the wound. The problem during the Civil War lay in leaving insufficient flap, which created a conical stump, and in beginning with the flap operation and ending with the circular, leaving variable but generally disastrous results. Whatever the procedure used, however, it was almost universally agreed at the time that amputation must be primary, that is, within twenty-four hours after receiving the wound, before the "irritative" stage took over and infection led quickly toward a useless limb or death. The rise in the mortality rate when amputation was left to the next day was in conflict with the fact that surgery before the patient rallied from shock was extremely dangerous. But the volume of wounded precluded many of these considerations, and many procedures were performed while the patient was still in shock or, possibly, had been given liquor in the attempt to rally him. Delay often meant, considering the poor antiseptic conditions, septicemia, and septicemia often meant a sure and painful death [4, 14] .
While advances in surgical technique were indeed important, by modem standards Civil War surgery was the last moment of procedures and ideas of an earlier age. Historian George Worthington Adams reflected that there is "such a gulf between the methods of that day and the aseptic routine of our own that centuries, not a mere two generations, might well have separated 1865 and 1914" [4] . The combination of anesthesia, which permitted surgical experimentation, and the absence of full antiseptic procedure until the decades after the war meant a high rate of wound infection [4] . While performing procedures that are easily comparable with those of today, Civil War era surgeons broke almost every rule of antiseptic method. They never scrubbed their hands sufficiently, wore a sterilized gown and mask, nor used sterilized instruments and sutures. When water was distant, surgeons in field hospitals would work for days without washing. As he waited for the next man to be placed on the table, the surgeon would stand back near the recently amputated limbs, holding his knife in his boot or even between his teeth. Due to these deplorable conditions, it is no wonder that infection was the war's leading killer [1] . Infection was, in fact, so common that the pus-producing staphylococcus infection was widely thought to be entirely a method of normal body repair. When a wound healed without suppuration, it was thought to be unusual. But as cleanliness gained favor and more and more wounds healed without suppuration, surgeons began questioning their tenets of healing process. It was gradually realized during the war that pus was not an entirely internal process, but rather the result of external factors. As pus-formation seemed to spread from one patient to another in hospitals, it was soon hypothesized that infection was airborne [4] .
However, while Lord Lister published his first paper on antisepsis in 1867, after the war, it is erroneous to conclude that the Civil War was fought entirely without antiseptic method. He was indeed the first to advertise carbolic acid as an antiseptic, but did not invent it and was not by any means the first to use it. The Sanitary Commission eventually took great pains to try to clean up camps, field hospitals, and city hospitals. Civil War surgeons actually used multiple antiseptic chemicals, mostly in hospitals, but did not know the time and place to use them. Infection often took hold before they were used because the nature of the bacteria and the spread of infection was still not understood [4] . Chemicals such as iodine, bromine, bichloride of mercury, and hydrochloric, sulfuric, nitric, and nitrous acids were extensively used in hospitals, but their ineffective application made infection a continuing problem. Part of the difficulty was the American Medical Association's 1864 campaign for ventilation of the hospitals, which attracted attention away from the patient to the surroundings, exaggerating the capacity for air to transport infection. By this campaign, the air was kept clean while the bandages wrapping the patient's wounds were as dirty as they had ever been. For instance, throughout the war no one ever thought about sterilizing surgical instruments [1 1]! Misunderstanding the nature of infection made treatment an enormous problem. Too often infection was allowed to run its full course until it was too late for any medicine to help. John Vance Lauderdale recognized this deficiency in the medical practice of the day:
We can't stop and talk with each patient, making such a careful examination as we would do in private practice or in a hospital, but we administer such remedies as we think will do them some good and pass to the next.
There are several very sick men -their disease is typhoid fever. We lost one this morning, and we fear many will go off before
[tomorrow] morning. Our treatment of these cases is very unsatisfactory, because we do not see them till the disease has nearly destroyed them. I would almost as soon die in battle as to fall a victim to fever ... [12] .
The primary medical treatment for most infections was liquor and quinine, although mercury was also occasionally used. However, even in the midst of the war some were beginning to doubt the usefulness, or even the possible benefits, of alcohol. Today, its use is definitely shunned, especially in cases of infection, because liquor leads to fatigue and the body generally needs all the strength it can muster [4] .
Although advances in the understanding of infection and its spread, the development of antiseptic method, and advances in surgical procedure were substantial contributions to medical science, their faulty implementation during the war years made the scientific gains only a modest aid to the thousands of wounded. First While the sacrifice that these wounded men made to medical science is tragic, the results in the post-war years were significant and substantial. This war was, importantly, the first in which medical data were conscientiously recorded. These records were later compiled in the monumental publication of 1870, The Medical and Surgical History of the War of the Rebellion, which is studied by both historians and physicians to this day [1] . In addition, the core of the nation's medical care apparatus was established by the now experienced veterans of the Civil War. Among the 15,000 medical men who had seen military service and who could now deliver adequate medical care in even the most rural areas of the country, physicians like S. Weir Mitchell, George R. Moorhouse, and William W. Keen became the core of academic medicine and medical research in the late nineteenth century [4] . The medical apparatus that accompanied the United States into the twentieth century and, soon enough, World War I, was beginning, albeit at the expense of many a young man sent to the battlefield, to be put together from many theoretical pieces during the war of 1861-1865.
The Civil War forced nineteenth century American doctors to make decisions of life and death on a massive scale while simultaneously enabling them to empirically determine the answers to their questions of the day. Medicine and surgery were still a great distance away from what we know as "modem," but the foundations had already been laid before this tragic war began. Starting in 1861, the gruesome casualties en masse of the first modem war forced physicians to decide the course that modem medicine and surgery would take. Arguments were still flying back and forth on issues such as the use of anesthesia, the management of hemorrhage, and the procedures and proper use of amputation. Sadly, many American young men quickly became the live bodies to be experimented upon in the resolution of surgery's pressing dilemmas. This was an experimentation that was forced upon the medical community, not elected by it. When faced with casualties on such a large scale, the surgeon is compelled to do whatever he can, whether or not he fully understands the mechanisms involved. This forced practice ground for surgeons resolved some of the crucial theoretical questions of the nineteenth century medical field, pushing the country and the world further toward modemization of medicine.
Unfortunately, however, the wounded of the War of the Rebellion could find little comfort in what was to come. A stage of experimentation is a stage of transition and a stage of transition never provides universal benefits. While many enjoyed relative health after a clean amputation conducted under somewhat sterile conditions in a hospital, many more suffered the tortures of pyemia and osteomyelitis which followed an incorrect procedure that left them open to little understood infections. The man on the field could not understand the enormity of the sacrifice he was making, both to the future of his country and to the future of his countrymen's health.
